Fetters of Debt, Deposit, or Gold during the Great Depression? The International Propagation of the Banking Crisis of 1931 by Gary Richardson & Patrick Van Horn
NBER WORKING PAPER SERIES
FETTERS OF DEBT, DEPOSIT, OR GOLD DURING THE GREAT DEPRESSION?









Comments from Naomi Lamoreaux inspired us to investigate this topic. We thank colleagues and friends
for comments on drafts of this essay. NSF Grant D/SES-0551232 funded portions of this research.
The views expressed herein are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the views of the
National Bureau of Economic Research.
© 2007 by Gary Richardson and Patrick Van Horn. All rights reserved. Short sections of text, not
to exceed two paragraphs, may be quoted without explicit permission provided that full credit, including
© notice, is given to the source.Fetters of Debt, Deposit, or Gold during the Great Depression? The International Propagation
of the Banking Crisis of 1931
Gary Richardson and Patrick Van Horn




A banking crisis began in Austria in May 1931 and intensified in July, when runs struck banks throughout
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  In May 1931, the largest financial institution in Austria, the Creditanstalt, collapsed, 
marking what is generally held to be the beginning of an international banking crisis. During the 
next month, financial difficulties spread throughout central Europe, as troubles beset banks in 
Hungary, Czechoslovakia, Romania, Poland, and Germany. On July 13, the failure of a large 
German bank, the Darmstadter- und Nationalbank, triggered runs throughout that nation and 
compelled the German government to close all depository institutions. Banks reopened for 
limited operations after two days and resumed normal operations after one month. Later that 
summer, the crisis spread to Britain. In September, sales of sterling and withdrawals from British 
banks accelerated. In order to halt financial outflows, Britain abandoned the gold standard (Barry 
Eichengreen, 1992; Peter Temin, 1989 and 1993; Charles Kindleburger, 1986). 
  According to the conventional academic wisdom, Britain’s departure from gold 
transmitted the financial crisis from Europe to the United States (Milton Friedman and Anna 
Schwartz, 1963; Eichengreen, 1981 and 1992; Temin, 1989 and 1993). Anticipating a similar 
action on the part of American monetary authorities, central banks and private holders in Europe 
converted dollar assets in the New York money market into gold. The unloading of bills swiftly 
assumed panic proportions. Gold outflows rose rapidly, draining funds from the U.S. financial 
system. To stop the international drain, the Federal Reserve System raised the discount rate from 
1½ to 3½ percent between October 9 and October 16. This was the  
sharpest rise within so brief a period in the whole history of the system, before or 
since … the move intensified internal financial difficulties and was accompanied 
by a spectacular increase in bank failures and runs on banks … in the six months 
from August 1931 through January 1932, 1,860 banks with deposits of $1,449 
million suspended operations, and the deposits of those banks that managed to 
keep afloat fell by a much larger sum. Total deposits fell over the six-month 
period by nearly five times the deposits in suspended banks or by no less than 17   2
percent of the initial level of deposits in operating banks (Friedman and Schwartz, 
1963, p. 317). 
 
Golden fetters, in other words, compelled the Federal Reserve to raise the discount rate and 
restrict the supply of credit, contributing to (or in many accounts, causing) the largest surge in 
bank suspensions in United States history. 
Recent research, however, reveals additional links that may have existed between the 
banking systems in the United States and Europe. Documents from the archives of “the Bank of 
England show that an intricate system of cross-deposits was set up by the Austrian Central Bank 
covertly to direct funds to the Creditanstalt via American and British banks – to compensate it 
for taking over the bankrupt Bodencreditanstalt (Iago Gil Aguado 2001, p. 199).” All of the 
American institutions involved in this shell game operated in New York City, the central money 
market of the United States. The cross-deposit involved tens of millions of dollars, a substantial 
multiple of the capital of the banks involved. In addition, bank balance sheets and clearing-house 
association reports show that New York banks’ foreign branches held deposits totaling over $600 
million dollars. Foreigners also held large sums in New York City. Thus, banks in the United 
States’ central money market had large, direct exposure to European deposits. 
Records resulting from the Senate Hearings on the Sale of Foreign Bonds or Securities in 
the United States, which took place from December 18, 1931 to February 10, 1932, illuminate 
another link between banks in New York and Europe.
1 New York banks organized over $1.4 
billion in loans to German corporations, utilities, and governments (including local, state, and 
national) from 1924 through 1930. Nearly $1 billion of those loans floated in the United States 
were outstanding in June 1931 (Robert Kuczynski, 1932). Econometric analysis of the links 
between the German and United State’s economies during the 1930s suggests that German debt 
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nd Congress, 1
st Session, Sale of Foreign Bonds or Securities in the United States, Hearings on Senate 
resolution 19 before the Committee on Finance, Parts 1-4.   3
played a role, perhaps substantial, in transmitting financial shocks across the Atlantic (Albrecht 
Ritschl and Samad Sarferaz, 2006). Analysis of equity returns also suggests a link through this 
channel (Hanan Morsy, 2002). 
An initial inspection of recently discovered data on bank failures in the United States 
reinforces the appearance of a direct link between the German and American banking crisis. 
Previously available evidence aggregated information on bank suspensions for Federal Reserve 
Districts at the quarterly level and for states at the annual level. This aggregation prevented 
scholars from determining whether bank failures in the central money market of the United 
States occurred in July and August, contemporaneous with the German crisis, or in September 
and October, when golden fetters bound. The disaggregated data show that almost all of the 
failures of banks in the central money market coincided with the crisis in Germany and preceded 
Britain’s departure from gold. Bank distress in New York City, in other words, rose when bank 
distress rose in Germany. Bank distress peaked in the weeks following the German panic. The 
banking crisis struck the central money market of the United States more than a month before 
financial pressures forced Britain off gold. 
This correlation raises questions about the channels that transmitted banking crises across 
the Atlantic. Temin (1993, pp. 93-4) describes three potential channels for the international 
transmission of banking crises. The first is a contagion of fear which jumps across nationally 
boundaries, when domestic depositors panic as foreigners withdraw funds. The second is the 
impact on portfolios when values of foreign assets fall and patterns of financial flows change. 
The third is the impact of capital flows on national economies and central bank policies, 
particularly in nations on the gold standard which raise interest rates to defend gold reserves. 
Temin indicates    4
 
that  
… it would be nice to choose between the alternative models, [but] this does not 
seem possible at the current state of our knowledge. … Economists do not yet 
know enough about international transmission of financial crises to have a single 
model, or even to choose which transmission channel was most important (Temin 
1993 p. 93-4). 
 
Our data-collection endeavors enable us to answer question such as: which channel transmitted 
the banking crisis from Europe to the United States in the third quarter of 1931? Did direct links 
exist between the banking crises in Germany and the United States? Did deposits, debt, 
correspondent relationships, or some other financial factor link the fate of money-center banks in 
New York to the fate of banks in Germany? 
This remainder of this essay answers those questions. Section 2 describes the 
quantitative, qualitative, and narrative sources of evidence. Section 3 examines patterns in the 
aggregate evidence which suggest a direct link between the crisis in Europe and the United 
States. Section 4 describes our statistical tests and econometric results. Section 5 examines 
contemporary evidence of the causes of bank distress in the central money market during the 
summer of 1931. Section 6 examines contemporary accounts of the regulatory regime changes 
that raised rates of bank distress in the central money market of the United States during the 
summer of 1931. Section 7 discusses the implications of our analysis. 
While the aggregate evidence suggests that a direct link existed between the financial 
crisis in Europe and the surge in bank failures in the central money market of the United States 
during the summer of 1931, the microeconomic evidence proves otherwise. Banks in New York 
City with substantial exposure to foreign financial flows survived the crisis of 1931 and the   5
contraction as a whole. Many of them remained profitable and paid dividends throughout the 
1930s.  
The correlation between the financial crisis on the continent and bank distress in New 
York City was coincidental, not causal. Bank distress in the central money market of the United 
States peaked during the summer of 1931 for reasons unrelated to financial incidents across the 
Atlantic. Political pressure and regulatory reform determined the timing of events in New York 
City. The impetus for these reforms arose from the failure of The Bank of United States in 
December, 1930, and the criticism directed at the Superintendent of Banks for the State of New 
York for his role in that institution’s collapse. 
  
2. Data 
Several sources provide the quantitative, qualitative, and narrative information needed to 
investigate the issues at hand. Quantitative sources contain data useful for econometrically 
analyzing the performance of New York City banks. Qualitative sources report contemporary 
conclusions concerning the causes of bank distress. Narrative sources describe events in the 
central money market during the financial crisis in the summer and fall of 1931 and the change 
in the regulatory regime that occurred at that time. 
Several sources provide quantitative information on banks’ characteristics. Rand 
McNally Bankers’ Directory provides data balance sheet figures, correspondents networks, 
Federal Reserve membership, and the services provided to depositors. Rand McNally also 
indicates for most sizeable New York banks whether the institution provided its customers with 
international transaction services and whether the institution possessed foreign branches. Rand 
McNally published biennially. Observations drawn from the July issue provide a panel of annual 
observations on state and national banks at their spring calls.    6
The Annual Report of the Superintendent of Banks of the State of New York provides 
more detailed financial data for state-chartered banks and trust companies. The information 
comes quarterly. It includes details of bank balance sheets, including the composition of 
investments (e.g. loans by type of collateral, stocks, bonds, discounts, cash, and deposits in other 
banks) and the composition of liabilities (e.g. time deposits, demand deposits, and borrowings 
from banks). The New York Times provides information on bank balance sheets in a weekly 
column entitled “New York Weekly Bank Statements.” The information includes demand, time, 
and foreign-branch deposits for all members of the clearing house and for many additional 
institutions. The Senate Hearings on the Sale of Foreign Bonds or Securities in the United States 
report loans to Germany arranged by banks in New York and outstanding when the banking 
crisis ignited on the continent. 
The call reports collected by the Comptroller of the Currency and the Federal Reserve 
Board provide more detailed information for banks belonging to the Federal Reserve System.  
For state-chartered member banks, balance sheets and income statements survive for the 
December and June calls for the first five years of the depression (i.e. December 1929 through 
December 1933). For national banks, balance sheets survive from the December 1929 and 
December 1931 calls. Income statements survive from the December 1929, June 1931, and 
December 1931 calls. The balance sheets provide detailed data about bank’s foreign exposure. 
Schedule G indicates holdings of foreign government bonds and other foreign securities. 
Schedule I indicates balances due in dollars and foreign currencies from foreign banks and 
foreign branches of U.S. banks. Schedule J indicates balances due to banks in foreign countries. 
Schedule L indicates time deposits of foreign banks and trust companies. Schedule D indicates   7
the number of branches in foreign countries. A balance sheet also exists for each foreign branch, 
which provides additional information about overseas operations.
2 
Information on changes in banks’ status – such as suspensions, liquidations, mergers of 
solvent institutions, and consolidations forced by financial difficulties – comes from the archives 
of the Federal Reserve Board of Governors’ Division of Bank Operations. From 1929 through 
1933, the Board recorded information about changes in bank status on the St. 6386 series of 
forms. The forms included information identifying each bank, financial information on the date 
of the change in status, and additional information about the transaction, such as the identities of 
the institutions with which it merged and whether a bank reorganized before it reopened. Form 
St. 6386a reported bank consolidations. A consolidation was the corporate union of two or more 
banks into one bank which continued operations as a single business entity and under a single 
charter. Some consolidations involved banks in financial difficulties. These consolidations often 
occurred at the behest of regulators, who sought to combine solvent but illiquid banks with 
healthier institutions. The Federal Reserve classified these events as consolidations due to 
financial difficulties.
3 
Form St. 6386b reported bank suspensions. A suspension occurred when a bank closed its 
doors to depositors and ceased conducting normal banking business for at least one business day. 
Some, but not all, suspended banks reopened for business. A liquidation was a permanent 
                                                 
2   The reports are available on microfilm from the Federal Reserve Board of Governors. See Joseph Mason, 1998 
for a description of the available data. 
3   The complete series of St. 6386  may be found in the National Archives, Record Group 82, Federal Reserve 
Central Subject File, file number 434.-1, “Bank Changes 1921-1954 Districts 1929-1954 - Consolidations, 
Suspensions and Organizations-St. 6386 a,b,c, (By States) 1930-1933.” The forms are filed alphabetically by 
state, name of town or city, and name of bank. Multiple entries for individual banks appear in chronological 
order. To avoid repeated, lengthy citations in the body of the essay, after quotations from the archival data, the 
information required to locate the form (i.e. name of state, town, bank) is indicated in brackets. For additional 
information about this source, see Gary Richardson, 2006a, 2006b, 2006c, 2006d, and Gary Richardson and 
William Troost, 2006.   8
suspension. A liquidating bank closed its doors to the public, surrendered its charter, and repaid 
depositors, usually under the auspices of a court appointed officer known as a receiver. 
Form St. 6386b included a section indicating the cause of a bank’s suspension (for 
descriptions of the process that Federal Reserve agents used to determine the cause and tests of 
the quality of their conclusions, see Gary Richardson, 2006b and 2006d). Federal Reserve 
attributed most suspensions to one (or more) of five common causes. The first was slow, 
doubtful, or worthless paper. The term worthless paper indicated an asset with little or no value. 
The term doubtful paper meant an asset unlikely to yield book value. The term slow paper meant 
an asset likely to yield full value in time, but whose repayment lagged or which could not be 
converted to full cash value at short notice. The second common cause of suspension was heavy 
withdrawals, the typical example being a bank run. The third was failure a banking 
correspondent. Correspondents were banks with ongoing relationships facilitated by deposits of 
funds. A typical example is a county bank (the client or respondent) which kept its reserve 
deposits within and cleared its checks through a national bank in a reserve city (the 
correspondent). The fourth common cause was mismanagement. The fifth was defalcation, a 
monetary deficiency in the accounts of a bank due to fraud or breach of trust. 
Form St. 6386c reported all other changes in bank status, including reopenings of 
suspended banks and voluntary liquidations. The latter was a category of closure in which banks 
ceased operations and rapidly arranged to repay depositors the full value of their deposits. 
Voluntary liquidations did not require the services of receivers and were not classified as 
suspensions. The categories of bank distress were typically construed to be temporary 
suspensions, terminal suspensions (i.e. liquidations), voluntary liquidations, and consolidations 
due to financial difficulties.    9
Combining the St. 6386 forms and the bank-balance sheet data described above yields a 
cross-sectional database of banks on the eve of the financial crisis at the beginning of July in 
1931. These sources also yield a panel database of banks in July of each year from 1929 through 
1932. These databases contain information about banks’ characteristics, financial health, and 
fates of greater detail than in any other extant source. 
Data on economic conditions comes from several sources. Bradstreet’s Weekly, Dun’s 
Review, The Commercial and Financial Chronicle, the Federal Reserve Bulletin, and the Annual 
Reports of the Federal Reserve Board and the Federal Reserve Bank of New York provide data 
on building permits, business failures, commodity prices, market interest rates, Federal Reserve 
discount rates, prices, and industrial production. The same sources also data on international 
flows of gold, goods, and funds. 
Several of the sources described above provide qualitative information on the causes of 
bank distress. The St. 6386 database indicates the Federal Reserve Division of Bank Operation’s 
conclusions concerning the cause of each bank suspension. The database also describes the 
financial difficulties that forced banks to seek consolidations, typically with the encouragement 
and assistance of regulators. The Annual Report of the Superintendent of Banks of the state of 
New York and press releases from the office of the bank superintendent (published in the New 
York Times and Wall Street Journal) indicate the conclusions of New York’s regulatory 
authorities concerning the cause of each bank closure. The Annual Report also indicates 
recoveries from banks in liquidation and payments to depositors, which reveals the extent of 
insolvency at institutions in receivership. The microfilmed call reports for national and Federal 
Reserve member banks contain examiners reports on the financial health of each institution. 
These assessments indicate the extent of each bank’s losses on investments (both past and   10
predicted) and recommendations as to whether the bank should remain in operations, increase its 
reserves, consolidate with another institution, or cease operations. 
Several sources provide a narrative history of events influencing the central money 
market in New York City during the summer and fall of 1931. The Annual Report of the 
Superintendent of Banks discusses events perceived to be important, changes in the regulatory 
regime, and the closure and consolidation of institutions. The report also indicates the number, 
salaries, experience, and assignments of bank examiners as well as the reason for changes in the 
size of the examination staff. Newspapers and periodicals – including the New York Times, Wall 
Street Journal, Bradstreet’s Weekly, Dun’s Review, Commercial and Financial Chronicle, and 
Bankers’ Magazine – regularly discussed events influencing banks in New York City. All of 
these outlets, for example, published articles about the demise of The Bank of United States, the 
investigation into the causes of its collapse, the public and legislative outcry over regulators’ role 
in these events, and the regulatory agencies reactions to this adverse publicity. 
 
3: Aggregate Patterns – Apparent Link Between Germany and New York 
An initial inspection of the evidence suggests the existence of a direct connection 
between the banking crisis in Germany and bank distress in New York. The chronological 
correlation is striking. 
Figure 1 illuminates the relationship. The figure plots weekly hazard rates for liquidation 
and consolidation due to financial difficulties for banks in New York City from July 1930 
through March 1933. The hazard function is a non-parametric estimate constructed by smoothing 
raw hazard rates (i.e. the number of bank liquidations divided by the number of banks at risk 
each week and the number of consolidations due to financial difficulties divided by the number 
of banks at risk in each week). The kernel is Epanechnikov. The bandwidth is two weeks, which   11
is wide enough to reveal trends without obscuring short-term shifts in the probability of failure. 
Figure 1 shows that the probability of failure rose rapidly at the beginning of July, as the 
European banking panic spread through central Europe. The increase accelerated as bank runs 
swept Germany, and the German government shut down their nation’s banking system. The 
probability of failure peaked in August, immediately after the reopening of banks in Germany but 
preceding Britain’s departure from gold. 
Table 1 provides additional details about the banks that failed in New York City during 
the Great Contraction. The table lists all of the banks forced to change status due to financial 
difficulties from January 1, 1929 through December 31, 1933. The fourth column indicates the 
type of change forced on the bank. Two types of changes predominated. The letter L indicates 
that the bank entered receivership and experienced liquidation. In all cases but one, the 
liquidation began at the behest of the superintendent of banks of the state of New York, after 
bank examiners determined that the institution faced financial difficulties so severe that it had to 
be closed to protect the interests of depositors and usually after determining that no other bank 
wished to consolidate with the afflicted institution. The exception was the Queesnboro National 
Bank, whose directors decided to turn the institution over to receivers. The letter C indicates that 
financial difficulties compelled the bank to consolidate with another institution. Most of these 
consolidations occurred at the behest of regulators after examinations revealed looming financial 
problems. Typical situations involved banks lacking liquidity or banks whose capital had been 
consumed by investment losses. Regulators threatened to close such institution unless their 
directors resolved the problems by injecting additional funds or merging with another institution. 
Many institutions that liquidated (i.e. L) had also sought consolidation, but failed to reach an 
agreement with another organization in time to forestall receivership.   12
Table 1’s first column indicates the date at which the bank closed its doors to depositors 
or consummated a consolidation with another institution. More than 60% of these transactions 
(16 out of 26) occurred during the two month period bounded by the failure of the Darmstadter- 
und Nationalbank on July 13, 1931 and Britain’s departure from gold on September 21, 1931. 
Only two banks failed in the wake of Britain’s departure from gold. One additional institution 
temporarily suspended payments during that period. For the sake of comparison, only two banks 
failed in December 1930, a period that Friedman and Schwartz referred to as the First Banking 
Crisis. Only one bank failed during the winter of 1933, when the drain of gold threatened to shut 
down the Federal Reserve Bank of New York and forced the President to declare a national 
banking holiday.  
The pattern of events appears clear. Bank distress in the central money market of the 
United States peaked during the European banking crisis in the summer of 1931. The correlation 
suggests that a direct connection existed between financial events in New York and on the 
continent, particularly Germany. Several channels could have linked banks on both sides of the 
Atlantic including foreign deposits, foreign debts, and correspondent relationships. 
 
4. Econometric Methods and Results 
The existence of detailed microdata on the potential channels of transmission allows us to 
test for a direct link between bank distress in Europe and New York. Our econometric methods 
resemble those of Isabel Schnabel (2004), Martin Petri (1998), and Richardson and Troost 
(2006). We regress indications of banks’ performance on (i) variables gathered from banks’ 
balance sheets, (ii) variables indicating banks’ financial health, (iii) variables indicating banks’ 
exposure to international debts, deposits, and financial flows, and (iv) variables indicating   13
fundamental forces affecting the aggregate economy. We examine a wide array of specifications 
commonly used in the literature, and test the statistical robustness of our results. 
Table 2 raises issues important for analyzing the evidence. The table reveals raw 
correlations between distressed departures from the banking business (i.e. liquidations, 
consolidations due to financial difficulties, and voluntary liquidations) and characteristics of 
banks. The correlations come from data on national and state member banks because for them 
detailed data on foreign exposure exists. The data comes from Comptroller of Currency call 
reports described in the preceding section. Similar data does not exist for state banks that did not 
belong to the Federal Reserve System. For those institutions, data on foreign holdings is limited. 
For non-member banks, the New York State Bank Superintendent’s Office did not publish 
information on the topic, in large part, because non-members lacked substantial foreign 
operations. Rand McNally Bankers’ Directory published limited information on the topic, 
consisting of the names of foreign correspondents institutions, and in some case, and in a few 
cases, foreign branches and foreign holdings. The extant information indicates non-member 
banks had little (and usually no) foreign operations and had limited foreign exposure. Excluding 
them from our econometric analysis does not distort our findings. 
In Table 2 column (3) reports results for the 51 national banks that operated in New York 
City during the summer of 1931. For national banks, the only call reports that survive from the 
five years preceding the time under investigation come from December 1929. This specification, 
therefore, utilizes data from that source. Column (2) reports results for the 29 state-member 
banks that operated in New York City during the summer of 1931. For state-member banks, call 
reports survive for each of the June and December calls during the late 1920s and early 1930s. 
The high frequency of the extant evidence enables us to draw data from the June 1931 call,   14
which indicates their financial status on June 30, 1931, a few weeks prior to the events under 
investigation. This specification employs that source. Expanding the data to the entire available 
panel yields similar results. 
Column (1) reports results for the national and state-member banks pooled together, a 
total of 80 institutions. For the variables in group (A), the correlation coefficients indicate the 
relationship between basic indicators of financial health and distressed departures from the 
banking business. The correlations are consistent with those commonly found in the literature. 
Banks with higher net worth failed less often than banks with lower net worth. Banks with more 
reserves failed less often than banks with fewer reserves. Banks with more liquid resources as a 
percentage of assets failed less often than banks with less liquid resources. The correlation 
coefficients in group (B) indicate the relationship between foreign exposure and distressed 
departures from the banking business. All six of the correlation coefficients are negative, 
indicating that the more foreign exposure possessed by banks, the lower the likelihood of their 
failure. The correlation coefficients in group (C) indicate the relationship between bank distress 
and foreign exposure as a share of total resources. The majority of these correlation coefficients 
are negative, indicating once again, that banks with greater foreign exposure failed at lower rates. 
The inverse correlation between foreign exposure and failure found in the microdata suggests 
that foreign exposure may not have been the reason that banks failed in New York City during 
the summer of 1931. 
Table 3 reinforces this result. The table reports cross tabulations between the incidence of 
bank distress and several measures of foreign exposure. The cross tabulation shows that none of 
the banks that departed from the banking business in the summer of 1931 possessed foreign 
branches, while two of the banks that survived the summer possessed such branches. The second   15
cross tabulation shows that none of the banks that departed from the banking business in the 
summer of 1931 possessed time deposits from financial institutions in foreign countries, while 
eight of the banks that survived the summer possessed such deposits. The third cross tabulation 
shows that none of the banks that departed from the banking business in the summer of 1931 
belonged to syndicates that extended loans to Germany during the 1920s, while four of the banks 
that survived the summer lead such syndicates. 
The final cross tabulation indicates the number of state and national banks forced to 
depart from the banking business by the different forms of bank distress. For example, regulators 
compelled two state-chartered banks belonging to the Federal Reserve System and seven 
nationally-chartered banks to consolidate with other institutions. Regulators liquidated four state 
member banks and one national bank. This cross tabulation highlights a feature of the data that 
shapes our econometric strategy.  
Discrete choice methods are a natural way to analyze the data at our disposal. For 
example, logistic models yield optimal estimates for binomial choices (such close doors to 
depositors or remain in operation) under a wide range of conditions. Multinomial logistic models 
yield optimal estimates for multinomial choices (such as remain in operation, consolidate, enter 
receivership, or voluntary liquidate) under a wide range of conditions. Table 3 reveals that for 
our data, those conditions do not exist. Perfect classifiers are the principle problem. Many 
measures of foreign exposure are perfect classifiers. Banks with foreign branches, for example, 
never experienced distress. Many characteristics of banks are also perfect classifiers. State banks, 
for example, never voluntarily liquidated. Perfect classifiers bedevil discrete choice methods, 
because discrete choice estimators cannot be calculated in the cases of perfect classification. 
Near perfect classifiers also impede accurate inference via discrete choice methods.   16
One way to circumvent this problem is to drop the perfect classifiers from the regression. 
But in our case, that strategy appears unpromising. The perfect classifiers include three key 
measures of foreign exposure: branches, deposits, and loans. In each case, banks that possessed 
this type of foreign exposure survived the crisis of the summer of 1931 (and the remainder of the 
contraction). This information is important and should not be discarded from the analysis for 
computational convenience. The other measures of foreign exposure turn out to be near perfect 
classifiers. For example, almost all banks with foreign exposure of any type survived the crisis in 
the summer of 1931 (and the entire depression). In such circumstances, discrete choice 
estimators do not possess optimal properties. 
A solution to this problem is the linear probability model. This model incorporates 
perfect classifiers without difficulty although coefficients estimated from it may be inefficient 
and, in certain circumstances, biased. These properties could be cause for concern, but our 
examination of the residuals from our regressions suggests that neither problem afflicts our 
estimates to a substantial degree. 
 Table 4 presents estimates based upon this model. The unit of observation is an 
individual bank. The data for each bank is drawn from the call report for the date closest to June 
30, 1931. The dependent variable equals one if the bank consolidated due to financial 
difficulties, entered receivership at the behest of regulators, or liquidated voluntarily between 
July 1, 1931 and December 31, 1931. The dependent variable equals zero otherwise. This 
indicator for bank distress is regressed on a vector of explanatory variables, including various 
measures of exposure to foreign financial forces and a vector of bank characteristics. The 
balance sheet characteristics includes standard measures of financial health such as net worth as 
a share of total resources, government securities as a share of total resources, other securities as a   17
share of total resources, reserves as a share of total resources, total deposits, and demand deposits 
as a fraction of total deposits. Other bank characteristics include the number of correspondents, 
the jurisdiction of its charter, and the age of the organization. All of these coefficients possess 
signs and magnitudes consistent with previously published studies, and therefore, are not 
reported in the table. The coefficients of interest are those on the variables indicating exposure to 
potential channels for the transmission of the foreign financial crisis. 
Column (1) reports these coefficients for a regression pooling data on all of the national 
and state member banks operating in the central money market on July 1, 1931. The signs of 
many coefficients are negative, indicating that increasing foreign exposure along that dimension 
reduced the likelihood of failure. For example, the coefficient on Foreign Government Bonds 
Owned, -0.034, suggests that increasing a bank’s holdings of foreign government bonds by 
$1,000,000 reduced the likelihood of the bank’s failure by 3.4%. The magnitudes of the positive 
coefficients are small, suggesting that if increasing foreign exposure along that dimension 
increased the probability of failure, the increase was minimal. The standard errors of the 
coefficients are large relative to the magnitudes. T-tests indicate that for each coefficient, the 
hypothesis that the coefficient equals zero cannot be rejected. An F-test indicates that the 
hypothesis that the all of the coefficients jointly equal zero cannot be rejected. 
Column (2) indicates the results when the sample is limited to the 29 state-member banks 
that operated in New York City during the summer of 1931. The results are similar. The signs of 
most of the coefficients are negative. The magnitudes of the positive coefficients are small. T-
tests indicate that for each coefficient, the hypothesis that the coefficient equals zero cannot be 
rejected. An F-test indicates that the hypothesis that the all of the coefficients jointly equal zero 
cannot be rejected.   18
Column (3) indicates the results when the sample is limited to the 51 national banks that 
operated in New York City during the summer of 1931. The results resemble those for the first 
two regressions. The signs on several of the coefficients are negative. An F-test indicates that the 
hypothesis that the all of the coefficients jointly equal zero cannot be rejected. T-tests on 
individual coefficients reject the hypothesis of equality with zero in four cases at the five percent 
level and in another case at the ten percent level. Their statistical significance entails an 
examination of the magnitude of these effects. 
Table 5 undertakes this task by comparing for each bank their foreign financial exposure 
with the probability of failure predicted by the regression (1) in Table 4. The seven dimensions 
of foreign financial exposure for which we have data are closely correlated. From the seven 
vectors of these variables, we can create an index of foreign financial exposure by deriving the 
principal components. The first principal component is a linear transformation of the vectors that 
explains the greatest possible variance in the data. This first principal component serves as our 
index. Banks for which the value of the index is lowest have the least foreign financial exposure. 
Banks for which the value of the index is highest have the most foreign financial exposure. 
For quintiles organized according to the extent of foreign exposure, Table 5 reports the 
average probability of distress predicted by regression (1) in Table 4 and the standard deviation 
of that average. The probability of failure appears constant across quintiles. Two-tailed tests 
cannot reject the null hypotheses of equality among the averages of the quintiles at standard 
significance levels. Only the banks with the largest foreign financial exposure appear to have a 
significantly lower probability of distress. For the eight banks with the highest foreign exposure, 
the predicted probability of distress is approximately 2%. For the two banks possessing networks 
of foreign branches, the predicted probability of distress is less than 1%.   19
Figure 2 summarizes these results. The vertical axis indicates the predicted probability of 
distress. The horizontal axis indicates our index of foreign financial exposure. The observations 
plot the predictions for each of the 80 banks in our sample. The pattern appears clear. For banks 
possessing low levels of foreign financial exposure, the probability of distress was independent 
of the extent of exposure. For banks possessing the highest levels of foreign financial exposure, 
however, the probability of distress was low and inversely correlated with the extent of exposure. 
In other words, banks with substantial foreign exposure failed much lower rates than other 
institutions, and as the extent of foreign exposure increased, the probability of failure fell. This 
econometric result seems reasonable, since all of the banks in New York City with substantial 
foreign financial exposure survived the depression. 
 
5. Contemporary Conclusions about the Causes of Bank Distress 
  Econometric evidence has advantages and disadvantages. Econometrics employs the 
power of statistics to illuminate relationships between variables after controlling for the influence 
of others. But, statistical inference remains vulnerable to the dangers of misspecification and 
misinterpretation. Statistical studies are also limited by paucity of data which, for financial 
institutions operating during the Great Depression, consists of infrequent observations of a subset 
of the relevant variables. 
The conclusions of contemporary observers complement such statistical evidence. 
Observers such as Federal Reserve agents, bank examiners, accountants, economists, and 
journalists had access to an array of information unavailable to modern scholars, including 
detailed, daily data about the financial status of and events affecting commercial banks. 
Contemporary observers also had the ability to talk with the man on the spot and possessed in-
depth knowledge about the institutions and issues at hand.   20
  Detailed records survive from several sets of contemporary observers. The first (and 
arguably the most important) is the St. 6386 database constructed by the Federal Reserve 
Board’s Division of Bank Operations. Table 6 summarizes the results of the Division’s analysis 
of bank suspensions. In 11 of 14 cases, the primary cause of suspension was the depreciation in 
the value of the bank’s assets. In two cases, heavy withdrawals were the primary cause of 
suspension. In another case, a bank failed after losing a substantial share of its capital to 
embezzlement. Comments written on the St. 6386 forms discuss reasons for the depreciation in 
the value of the bank’s portfolio, principally the declining value of stocks, corporate bonds, and 
real estate. In all cases, the comments refer to declines of domestic assets. In no instance do the 
comments refer to foreign investments or German debt. 
  The Division of Bank Operations also tracked consolidations due to financial difficulties. 
Table 7 summarizes the results of this endeavor. All but one of the banks forced to consolidate in 
1931 suffered from frozen assets or impaired capital. The examiners who discovered these 
afflictions reached conclusions like Midwood Trust Company’s condition was “such as to 
necessitate its being taken over by some other institution.”
4 Long Island National Bank’s health 
was “such as to necessitate an immediate absorption.” “The condition of the International Trust 
Company was such as to make desirable their being taken over by a stronger institution.” In 
almost all of these cases, the absorbing bank took all of the assets of the troubled bank in 
exchange for assuming the deposits and some, but not all, of the other liabilities of the troubled 
institution. The Division of Bank Operations attributed the financial difficulties to domestic 
factors. In no instance does the Division discuss international events, deposits, or debts. 
  Like the Division of Bank Operations, the New York State Bank Superintendent’s office 
investigated the cause of suspension for each state-chartered bank, trust company, and private 
                                                 
4 Footnote number 3 explains how to locate the archival documents quoted in this paragraph.   21
bank. These amounted to 13 of the 14 institutions that closed their doors to depositors during the 
summer of 1931. The superintendent released initial statements about the cause of each closure 
on the date that the institution closed its doors and in the weekly bulletin of the Department of 
Banking. Final conclusions appeared in the Department of Banking’s Annual Report. So did 
information about the rate of recovery from institutions undergoing liquidation. These sources 
described the cause of Chelsea Bank’s and Trust Companies demise to be “rumors” that 
circulated “which have caused abnormal withdrawals of deposits,” prompting the examiners to 
close the bank to conserve its assets. In all other instances, the sources contained statements such 
as ‘because of a non-liquid condition and depreciation of its assets, it is unsafe and inexpedient 
to permit the institution to continue in business.’ The Department of Banking attributed the 
financial difficulties of all of these institutions to domestic factors, particularly the declining 
values of securities, bonds, and real estate, which reduced the value and liquidity of banks’ 
portfolios. In no instance does the Department of Banking discuss international factors, such as 
foreign deposits or German debt. 
The conclusions of contemporary observers seem clear. During the summer of 1931, the 
banks that ceased operations did so for reasons unrelated to the financial crisis in Europe. The 
source of distress was the declining value of domestic assets – principally real estate, stocks, and 
bonds – and withdrawals from banks which appeared to be headed for financial trouble. The 
banks that closed their doors or consolidated with other institutions did not due so because 
foreign depositors withdrew funds or because German debt declined in value.  
Might there be something that contemporary observers missed? Perhaps the banking 
crisis in Germany altered patterns of mergers among American banks. For years, depository 
institutions had been combining operations, as growing banks absorbed smaller competitors and   22
turned them into branches. Perhaps patterns of these mergers changed, forcing banks that would 
have merged voluntary into the hands of regulators who ordered them either to consolidate on 
less advantageous terms or to depart from the banking business.  
Figure 3 addresses this issue. It compares a non-parametric estimate of the hazard rate for 
consolidations due to distress to a non-parametric estimate of the hazard rate for voluntary 
mergers. The estimate for the former is identical to that in Figure 1. The estimate for the latter is 
constructed by kernel-smoothing raw hazard rates for mergers of healthy banks (i.e. mergers per 
week divided by number of banks at risk). The kernel is Epanechnikov. The bandwidth is five 
weeks. The rate of mergers follows no discernible trend. It varies from month to month but the 
distribution remains roughly constant over time. The rate of consolidations due to distress 
follows a dramatically different pattern. Almost all the banks that consolidate this way do so 
during 1931. The largest cluster occurs during July and August, the months when the banking 
panic peaked on the continent.  
Consider another possibility. Perhaps widespread withdrawals from foreign accounts 
occurred, putting pressure on the central money market as a whole, which forced the weakest 
banks in New York City out of business. Our econometric analysis might have missed an event 
such as this, because the annual, quarterly, and cross-sectional databases which we analyze lack 
high-frequency deposit data which could detect such shifts. But, other data sets contain weekly 
data on deposits in New York City banks. These data sets include the column “New York 
Weekly Bank Statements” published each week in the New York Times and the compilation of 
member bank balance sheets released weekly by the Federal Reserve Bank of New York, 
published in many periodicals (e.g. Bradstreet’s Weekly, Dun’s Review, The Commercial and 
Financial Chronicle, and in the New York Times entitled “New York City Reporting Member   23
Banks”), and recapitulated in the records of the New York Fed and Board of Governors. Both 
data sets show that deposits at New York City banks in August 1931 were comparable to 
deposits at New York City banks in August 1930. The small fall in deposits during the summer 
of 1931 (approximately 4%) resembled typical seasonal variation.   
 
6. Contemporary Accounts Reveal the Cause of the Correlation 
  This essay began with an observation about the financial crises – the period of acute bank 
distress in the central money market of the United States followed closely on the banking crisis 
in Germany and preceded Britain’s abandonment of the gold standard – and then this essay 
produced a puzzle. No financial link appears to have existed between the banking crisis on the 
continent and in New York City. The banks that failed in New York lacked exposure to foreign 
deposits, German debt, and other factors that might have transmitted the financial crisis across 
the Atlantic. Numerous banks in New York had substantial exposure to such sources of 
contagion. This exposure included hundreds of millions of dollars in foreign deposits, over one 
billion dollars in German debt, and large holdings of foreign assets. But, the institutions engaged 
in the international banking business survived the contraction. These internationally-oriented 
institutions were an island of strength in a sea of turmoil. Their prosperity seems surprising, 
relative to the performance of other American banks, which failed in droves during the 
downturn. 
  What can resolve the riddle? Why was bank distress in the central money market 
chronologically correlated with the banking crisis on the continent despite the fact that banks 
with financial links to Europe weathered the storm? Our research reveals an important piece of 
the puzzle. The behavior of the New York’s Banking Department changed during the summer of 
1931. Eight months before, in December 1930, The Bank of United States failed. It was the   24
fourth largest depository institution in New York and the eighth largest in the nation. From 
December 1930 through June 1931, “practically the entire examination force in the metropolitan 
district was engaged in the liquidation of the Bank of United States (Superintendent of Banks 
1931, p. 19).” The concentration of examination resources on this case compelled the 
superintendent’s office to expand the size of its staff. The rigidity of civil service regulations, 
however, slowed the process and impeded the hiring of experienced individuals. Eventually, “it 
was necessary to obtain executive permission to employ temporary examiners not taken from 
Civil Service lists and to reinstate former examiners whose wide experience was desperately 
needed (Superintendent of Banks 1931, p. 19).” The Civil Service Commission insisted that for 
each examiner appointed who was not a civil servant, an appointment had to be made from the 
civil service list, which at the time, included few individuals with the training, talent, or aptitude 
for bank-examination work. These restrictions slowed the department’s effort to respond to the 
emergency. 
  The department managed to increase the examination staff to 192 members at the end of 
1931, up from 131 in December 1930. In addition, for a period of seven months, the department 
“obtained the assistance of twenty-eight men whose services were donated by various banks as 
well as the aid of fifteen Federal Reserve examiners who were temporarily lent to the department 
(Superintendent of Banks 1931, p. 17).” Bureaucratic delays and the time to train the new 
examiners meant that the size of the effective examination staff increased substantially during 
the summer of 1931. At the same time that these new resources came on line, the permanent 
examination staff for the metropolitan district, which had focused on The Bank of United States 
from January through June, finished that investigation and returned to regular duties. Thus, in the 
summer of 1931, the effective number of examiners in New York City increased substantially.   25
The number of bank examinations, which had been conducted infrequently for many months, 
increased commensurately.  
  The examinations also increased in intensity. The banking department adopted “new 
regulations for the purpose of obtaining more complete information on loans and security 
portfolios (Superintendent of Banks 1931, p. 17).” These changes included new reporting forms 
designed to “instantly reflect trends and policies of each state bank and trust company” and new 
methods for “arriving at fair values of securities (Superintendent of Banks 1931, p. 17).” These 
innovations stemmed from a reorganization of the banking department begun in the spring of 
1929 and completed in the wake of the failure of The Bank of United States. 
  The post-examination powers of the banking department also increased. In the spring, the 
state legislature passed several reform bills introduced at the request of the state bank 
superintendent. The first bill permitted the hiring of additional examiners in an emergency. The 
second reduced from 30 to 20 days the time allowed for filing claims against a bank by the 
superintendent after notice had been sent to creditors. The third allowed the superintendent to act 
on the findings of Clearing House examinations as if they were examinations conducted by the 
state banking department. Two other bills failed to progress past the banking committee. One 
would have permitted the superintendent to consolidate banks overnight in emergencies. The 
other would have authorized the superintendent to remove officers of a bank upon evidence 
showing them responsible for improper conditions (Wall Street Journal, March 13, 1931, p. 8 
“State Banking Bills”). The superintendent argued that the rejected reforms would have provided 
him with the ability to forestall the failure of The Bank of United States. Critics of the 
Superintendent, including many legislators on the banking committee, asserted that the   26
superintendent possessed more than enough authority to have prevented the crisis had he acted 
when irregularities at The Bank of United States were first brought to his attention in 1929. 
  Criticism of the superintendent, Joseph Broderick, peaked in June, when the case against 
the directors of the Bank of United States reached trial. A New York Times headline blared 
“STATE CALLED LAX IN BANK FAILURES (New York Times, June 14, 1931, p. 1 – 
emphasis in original).” Another headlined reported that the superintendent had been accused of 
“Gross Negligence” for his performance on The Bank of United States (New York Times, June 
27, 1931, p. 2).  A former state attorney general circulated a letter calling for a general 
investigation of the banking department and drawing parallels between its performance in the 
current case and problems in the past. The chairman of the Republican State Committee sent a 
letter to Governor Roosevelt requesting an inquiry and demanding the removal of Superintendent 
Broderick (New York Times, June 26, 1931, p. 7). The state legislature discussed the creation of 
a special committee to investigate the banking department and considered a bill authorizing suits 
against state bank employees who performed their jobs negligently. 
  The chorus of criticism focused on the banking department’s slow response after 
discovering the financial problems faced by The Bank of United States. In statement and 
testimony in hearings concerning The Bank of United States, the superintendent revealed that the 
irregularities which lead to the bank’s demise were first brought to his attention in the summer of 
1929. Then, he believed that “he would have been ‘gravely remiss in his sworn duty if he did not 
exhaust every possible resource to save the situation before deciding that the doors must be 
closed’ (Wall Street Journal, March 6, 1931, p. 2).” He allowed The Bank of United States to 
continue operations for more than a year, and during that time, to continue conducting certain   27
transactions, “which he admits were dishonest even if inside the letter of the law,” and to 
continue to accumulate losses, in hopes that some remedy for the situation would be found.  
Now, in the summer of 1931, the superintendent planned to deal with such situations 
expeditiously, and requested an expansion of his powers to enable him to take control of banks 
whenever he deemed it in the public interest. He planned to encourage the consolidation of banks 
“in cases where it appeared the result would be generally beneficial. This tendency toward 
consolidation, resulting as it does in the disappearance of many independent units, effects a 
concentration of banking resources and improved management which should lend itself to the 
development of sound policies and the elimination of unwarranted competition (Superintendent 
of Banks, 1931, p. 7).” 
  The impact of the superintendent’s new policies and increased authority can be seen in 
the wave of examinations that swept New York City in the summer of 1931. New stringent 
procedures highlighted investment losses and potential problems at numerous institutions. The 
superintendent’s office moved swiftly to rectify such shortfalls. The department demanded that 
the bank’s shareholders, directors, and management come up with capital to cover the losses, or 
consolidate with other institutions, which typically required them to realize large losses (in many 
cases, their entire investment), or face seizure by the superintendent’s office. A dramatic climax 
of the campaign came on August 5, when the Superintendent Broderick seized three banks 
(American Union, International Madison, and Times Square Trust), on the same morning. The 
seizures upset the plans of the joint legislative committee on banking to hold a hearing at the Bar 
Association Building that afternoon to discuss the recommendations of Mr. Broderick and the 
performance of the banking department. The announcement cancelling the hearings noted that 
“the taking over of the three banks made it impossible for Mr. Broderick or the bankers to appear   28
before the committee (New York Times, August 6, 1931, p. 32).” During the next three weeks, 
Superintendent Broderick oversaw the liquidation of those three depositories, compelled the 
consolidation of an additional five New York City banks, and supervised the examination and 
sanctioning of number other institutions. His office remained so busy that the public hearings on 
his performance appear to have been postponed indefinitely. 
While it is impossible to know for sure why bank supervision became more aggressive 
during the summer of 1931, it seems likely that the change stemmed from pressure on the bank 
superintendent, changes in the incentives and attitudes of the superintendent and his staff, the 
growth of resources available to the banking department, and the expansion of de jure and de 
facto regulatory authority. It seems clear that the aggressive behavior of the banking department 
produced the spike in suspensions in the central money market that appears to be closely 
correlated with the financial crisis in Europe. The timing of the suspensions in New York 
appears to have been a delayed reaction to the failure of The Bank of United States. The reaction 
took place eight months after the trigger because it took time to deploy additional regulatory 
resources and because it took time for political pressures (and perhaps learning by doing) to alter 
the mindset of the regulators. It is possible that concern about the banking crisis on the continent 
could have played a role in altering the behavior of banking authorities, but our extensive 
searches have uncovered no evidence to support this hypothesis. 
 
7. Discussion 
  A chronological correlation exists between the banking crisis in Germany following the 
collapse of the Creditanstalt and the banking crisis in New York City during the summer of 
1931. Banks in New York City sponsored billions of dollars in German debt and held hundreds   29
of millions of dollars in European deposits. Those debts and deposits provided potential channels 
for the transmission of the banking panic across the Atlantic. 
A wide range of evidence indicates, however, that American banks with substantial 
foreign exposure survived the contraction. Most continued to pay dividends throughout the 
depression. In other words, the debt and deposit links between the banking systems in Europe 
and America did not convey the banking crisis across the Atlantic. The chronological correlation 
of the banking crises in Germany and New York was coincidental, not causal. 
  This realization raises several issues regarding the study of bank distress during the Great 
Depression. The first pertains to the uniqueness of the United States central money market. 
Scholars have long recognized that the pattern of bank distress in New York City differed from 
the pattern of distress for the national as a whole. In New York City, few banks closed their 
doors to depositors; while in the rest of the nation, nearly half of all banks went out of business. 
Our study suggests that the behavior of the New York state banking department had much to do 
with the stability of banks in the central money market. The superintendent’s office actively 
merged weak banks with stronger institutions. The law required banks in New York City to hold 
larger reserves and greater capital than depository institutions elsewhere in the nation. These 
legal requirements left a large cushion between the onset of difficulties and the point of no 
return. The superintendent used this cushion as a window of opportunity to resolve bank distress 
short of receivership. The superintendent’s vigilance meant that few institutions failed in New 
York City and those that did go out of business returned substantial sums to depositors.  
  A second issue is the political economy of bank regulation. Regulators determined the 
fate of many banks. What influenced the decisions made by bank regulators, such as the New 
York Superintendent of Banks and his subordinates? Ideology, experience, politics, legislation,   30
and self interest all played a part. The superintendent’s treatment of troubled banks changed over 
time. Changing economic conditions may have been one reason. The optimal method of 
resolving financial difficulties depends on the short-term prospects for sustaining cash flow and 
the long-term prospects for earning profits. Both factors fluctuated during the 1930s. Changing 
legislation was another reason. Politicians provided the banking department with additional tools 
for dealing with bedeviled banks. Political decisions also changed the incentives of the 
superintendent, who had been appointed as a reformer in the spring of 1929 and was criticized as 
incompetent two years later. The failure of The Bank of United States was the principal cause of 
criticism. Its demise led to political pressures which pushed the superintendent of banks to take a 
prophylactic approach towards imperiled banks. 
  A third issue concerns correlations between events in financial centers in the United 
States and Europe. Causal links may have created some of these correlations. But, this essay 
shows that coincidences created others. This realization suggests that there is a danger of 
drawing false inferences from correlations between events in different countries during the Great 
Depression. With so many things going wrong in so many countries in such a short span of time, 
numerous chronological correlations would have been generated by random chance. 
  A final issue concerns the international transmission of the banking crisis in the summer 
and fall of 1931. Numerous channels could have transmitted the financial crisis across the 
Atlantic. Direct links between banks in Europe and the United States appear to have been 
plausible candidates, but this essay demonstrates that those direct links did not, in fact, spread of 
the affliction. Thus, golden fetters remain the principal explanation for the trans-Atlantic 
transmission of the financial panic in the fall of 1931.   31
  While our conclusion conflicts with the claims of several recent scholars, it concurs with 
the consensus of seminal scholars who have studied the issue, including Eichengreen, Friedman, 
Schwartz, and Temin (Friedman and Schwartz, 1963; Eichengreen, 1981 and 1992; Temin, 1989 
and 1993). Temin expresses this consensus clearly when he writes:  
In one of the most memorable acts of misguided monetary policy in history, the 
Federal Reserve raised interest rates sharply in October 1931 to protect the dollar 
– in the midst of the greatest Depression the modern economy has ever known 
(Temin 1993 p. 96). 
 
Our essay supports this statement, by demonstrating that the Federal Reserve’s actions were the 
principal mechanism transmitting the banking panic of 1931 from Europe to the United States. 
Banks operating in New York City held more foreign deposits and had greater foreign exposure 
than banks operating elsewhere. Since high levels of foreign exposure did not force banks out of 
business in New York City, it is unlikely that low levels of foreign exposure forced banks out of 
business in other places. The policy predispositions engendered by the gold standard and the 
Federal Reserves monetary missteps were the ultimate cause of the banking crisis that struck the 
United States in the fall of 1931. 
 
   32
Table 1 
Bank Distress in New York City, 1929 to 1933 
 
Date  Bank  Type  Distress  Capital  Loans and Investment 
December 11, 1930  Bank of  United States SM  L  25,250,000 213,403,000 
December 23, 1930  Chelsea Bank and Trust Company  S  L 2,500,000  19,673,000 
March 20, 1931  World Exchange Bank  S  L  500,000  1,879,000 
March 31, 1931  Bay Parkway National Bank  N  C  200,000  1,358,000 
July 15, 1931  Lebanon National Bank  N  C  500,000  894,000 
July 28, 1931  Prisco State Bank  S L  250,000 1,810,000 
August 4, 1931  Midtown Bank  S  C  769,000  2,741,000 
August 5, 1931  American Union Bank  SM  L  1,000,000  7,765,000 
August 5, 1931  International-Madison Bank and Trust Company  SM  L  1,750,000  9,255,000 
August 5, 1931  Times Square Trust Company  SM  L  1,000,000  3,323,000 
August 10, 1931  Midwood Trust Company  SM  C  1,000,000  8,484,000 
August 22, 1931  Long Island National Bank of New York  N  C  250,000  2,668,000 
August 22, 1931  Globe Bank and Trust Company  SM  L  1,525,000  7,175,000 
August 24, 1931  Queensboro National Bank of the City of New York  N  L  200,000  1,781,000 
August 25, 1931  Bryant Park Bank  P  C  500,000  1,719,000 
August 25, 1931  Brooklyn National Bank  N  C  500,000  1,719,000 
August 28, 1931  Bank of Europe Trust Company  SM  L  1,000,000  13,636,000 
August 29, 1931  National Bank of Ridgewood  N  C  200,000  1,286,000 
September 15, 1931  International Trust Company  SM  C  3,200,000  12,440,000 
September 15, 1931  Straus National Bank and Trust Company  N  C  2,000,000  9,006,000 
October 30, 1931  Federation Bank and Trust Company  SM  TS  750,000  14,936,000 
October 31, 1931  M. Bernandi State Bank  S  L  350,000  2,235,000 
December 4, 1931  Sakser State Bank  S  L  100,000 1,236,000 
March 30, 1932  Washington National Bank  N  VL  500,000  997,000 
April 8, 1932  Liberty National Bank and Trust Company  N  C  2,250,000  8,816,000 
February 14, 1933  D.J. Faour and Bros.  P  L  100,000  711,000 
 
Notes: N indicates national bank. S indicates state bank. SM indicates a state bank that is a member of the Federal Reserve System. P 
indicates private bank. L indicates liquidation. C indicates a consolidation due to financial difficulties. TS indicates temporary 
suspension. VL indicates a voluntary liquidation. Source: St. 6386 Database, see Richardson (2006) for details.  33
Table 2 
Correlation Coefficients Between Distressed Departure and Balance Sheet Characteristics 
For National and State Member Banks 
 
 
All State  National 
 
(1) (3)  (2) 
      
(A) Basic Balance Sheet Characteristics     
Net Worth as a Percentage of Liabilities  -0.019  0.077  -0.046 
U.S. Government Debt as a Percentage of Assets  -0.087  -0.163  -0.007 
Stocks, Bonds, and other Securities as a Percentage of Assets  -0.038  0.045  -0.070 
Reserves as a Percentage of Assets (Cash, due from Banks, Fed deposits)  -0.119  -0.289  -0.179 
Demand Deposits as a Percentage of Liabilities  -0.118  0.110  -0.030 
     
(B) Foreign Exposure in Dollar Values     
Balances Payable in Dollars Due from Foreign Branches of American Banks  -0.069  -0.105  -0.080 
Due from Banks in Foreign Countries  -0.152  -0.201  -0.123 
Due to Banks in Foreign Countries  -0.141  -0.180  -0.115 
Time Deposits of other Banks and Trust Companies in Foreign Countries  -0.125  -0.185  -0.084 
Foreign Government Bonds Owned  -0.157  -0.214  -0.151 
Other Foreign Securities Owned, Including bonds of municipalities  -0.167  -0.214  -0.135 
     
(C) Foreign Exposure as a Share of Total Resources     
Balances Payable in Dollars Due from Foreign Branches of American Banks  -0.081  -0.105  -0.080 
Due from Banks in Foreign Countries  -0.087  -0.090  -0.117 
Due to Banks in Foreign Countries  -0.206  -0.250  -0.180 
Time Deposits of other Banks and Trust Companies in Foreign Countries  -0.140  -0.187  -0.108 
Foreign Government Bonds Owned  0.048  -0.215  -0.014 
Other Foreign Securities Owned, Including bonds of municipalities  0.041  -0.052  0.038 
       
 
Sources: See text. 
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Table 3 
Foreign Exposure and Bank Distress 
Selected Cross-Tabulations for National and State-Member Banks, 1931 
 
    
   Foreign  Branches 
   No  Yes 
No Distress    62  2 
Distress   16  0 
        
   Foreign  Deposits 
   No  Yes 
No Distress    56  8 
Distress   16  0 
      
   German  Loans 
   No  Yes 
No Distress    60  4 
Distress   16  0 
      
   State National
No Distress    22  42 
Consolidation Due to Distress    2  7 
Liquidation   4  1 
Temporary Suspension    1  0 
Voluntary Liquidation    0  1 
        
 
Sources: See text.  35
Table 4 
Foreign Exposure, Balance Sheet Characteristics, and Bank Distress 
Linear Probability Model Regression Results 
 
Dependent Variable: Distressed Departures from the Banking Business 








 (1) (2)   (3) 
         
-0.030  -0.001   17.250  Balances Payable in Dollars Due from 
Foreign Branches of American Banks  0.073   0.002   7.039 
         
Due from Banks in Foreign Countries  -0.020   -0.411   -1.221 
  0.034   0.689   0.490 
         
Due to Banks in Foreign Countries  0.000   0.116   0.045 
  0.010   0.169   0.047 
         
0.016  -0.098   -0.968  Time Deposits of other Banks and Trust 
Companies in Foreign Countries  0.041   0.168   0.583 
         
Foreign Government Bonds Owned  -0.034   -0.086   -1.458 
  0.028   0.148   0.685 
         
-0.002  0.013   1.175  Other Foreign Securities Owned, Including 
bonds of municipalities  0.044   0.473   0.5992 
         
Number of Foreign Branches  -0.003       -0.411 
  0.007       0.191 
         
Bank Balance Sheet Characteristics Vector  Yes   Yes   Yes 
      
      
Observations 80   29   51 
F-statistic 1.55   0.91   0.77 
R-squared 0.06   0.2   0.18 
Predictions < 0  4   4   6 
         
 
Notes: All monetary variables measured in units of millions of dollars, except for Balances 
Payable in Dollars Due from Foreign Branches of American Banks, which is measured in 
thousands of dollars. Robust standard errors appear below coefficient estimates. Italic font 
indicates significant at 10% level. Boldfaced font indicates significant at 5% level. 
 
Sources: See text.   36
Table 5 
Predicted Probability of Failure and the Extent of Foreign Exposure 
 
Extent of Foreign Exposure    Predicted Probability of Failure  
   Average Standard 
Deviation
Observations 
    
Bottom Quintile     0.171 0.071 16 
Below Average Quintile    0.226 0.065 16 
Middle Quintile    0.242 0.070 16 
Above Average Quintile    0.257 0.053 16 
Top Quintile    0.120 0.117 16 
    
Top Eight Banks    0.021 0.027 8 
Banks with Foreign Branches    0.008 0.011 2 
    
 
Notes: The extent of foreign exposure is measured as the first principal component 
derived from the variables measuring exposure to foreign financial factors in the 
regression in Table 6. 
 
Source: See text.  37
Table 6 
Causes of Suspensions in New York City, 1929 through 1933 
 
 
        
   
    
 
Causes of Suspension 
  Date of  
Suspension 







                   
December 11, 1930    Bank of  United States  202,965,000  41,965,000 78        Assets Withdrawals  
December 23, 1930    Chelsea Bank and Trust Company 18,801,000           Withdrawals Assets   
                    
March 20, 1931    World Exchange Bank  1,910,000       200,000    Assets    
July 28, 1931    Prisco State Bank  1,902,000            Defalcation     
August 5, 1931    American Union Bank  7,939,000  845,000  36    628,000    Assets Withdrawals  
August 5, 1931    International-Madison Bank  7,778,000  967,000  36    1,004,000    Assets Withdrawals  
August 5, 1931    Times Square Trust Company  2,882,000  1,444,000  36    300,000    Assets Withdrawals  
August 22, 1931    Globe Bank and Trust Company  7,426,000  2,060,000  53    973,000    Assets Withdrawals  
August 24, 1931    Queensboro National Bank  2,492,000            Withdrawals     
August 28, 1931    Bank of Europe Trust Company  12,807,000  3,307,000  59    200,000    Assets   
October 30, 1931    Federation Bank and Trust Company  13,390,000  1,220,000  31    858,000    Assets Withdrawals  
October 31, 1931    M. Bernandi State Bank  1,253,000  153,000  31    750,000    Assets   
December 4, 1931    Sakser State Bank 1,074,000  134,000 65    400,000   Assets   
                     
February 14, 1933    D.J. Faour and Bros.  527,000        78,000    Assets   
                  
 
Notes: Deposits indicates the deposits held by the bank on the last call date before suspension. Deposit losses indicates the decline in 
deposits between the last call date and the date of suspension. The information needed to calculate this figure exists only in the listed 
cases. Days lost indicates the number of days between the last call date and the date of suspension, or in other words, the number of 
days over which the decline in deposits was calculated. Borrowings indicates loans outstanding from the Federal Reserve and other 
banks on the date of suspension. See Section 2 for definitions of the primary and contributing causes of suspensions. Asset indicates 
that slow, doubtful, or worthless investments were a source of bank distress. Withdrawal indicates that withdrawals of deposits were a 
source of bank distress. Defalcation indicates that embezzlement was a source of bank distress. 
 
Source: St. 6386 Database, see Richardson 2006 for details.   38
Table 7 
Consolidations Due to Financial Difficulties in New York City, 1929 through 1933 
 
Date    Consolidating Bank    Absorbing Bank  Description of consolidation  Disposition   
             
March 31, 1931    Bay Parkway National Bank    Lafayette National Bank       
July 15, 1931    Lebanon National Bank    Manufacturers Trust   All except capital  Branch   
August 4, 1931    Midtown Bank    Manufacturers Trust  All except capital  Discontinued   
August 10, 1931    Midwood Trust    Manufacturers Trust   All except capital  Branch   
August 22, 1931    Long Island National Bank    National City Bank  Liquidation basis  Branch   
August 25, 1931    Bryant Park Bank    Manufacturers Trust   Assets and deposits  Discontinued   
August 25, 1931    Brooklyn National Bank    Manufacturers Trust   Assets and deposits  Discontinued   
August 29, 1931    National Bank of Ridgewood    The Richmond National Bank  All except capital  Branch   
September 15, 1931    International Trust    Continental Bank and Trust    Branch   
September 15, 1931    Straus National Bank and Trust    Continental Bank and Trust    Branch   
              
April 8, 1932    Liberty National Bank and Trust    Harriman National Bank and Trust    Branch   
              
 
Notes: The consolidating bank was the institution suffering financial difficulties. The absorbing bank was a healthy 
institution which took over the affairs of its weaker compatriot. Description of consolidation describes the financial details 
of the transaction. “All except capital” indicates that the absorbing bank assumed all liabilities except the capital liability of 
the consolidating institution and acquired all of its assets. “Assets and deposits” indicates that the absorbing bank assumed 
only the deposit liabilities of the consolidating institution while acquiring all of its assets. “Liquidation basis” indicates that 
the absorbing bank acquired all assets and liabilities of the consolidating bank, and if the assets proved more valuable than 
the obligations of the consolidating institution, returned a portion of the surplus to the shareholders. Disposition indicates 
what became of the offices of the consolidating bank. “Branch” indicates that the offices of the consolidating bank became 
a branch of the absorbing institution. “Discontinued” indicates that the offices of the consolidating bank ceased operations. 
 
Source: St. 6386 Database, see Richardson 2006 for details.   39
Figure 1 
Weekly Hazard for Liquidation and Consolidation Due to Distress 
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Notes: The hazard function is a non-parametric estimate constructed by smoothing raw hazard 
rates (i.e. the number of bank liquidations divided by the number of banks at risk each week and 
the number of consolidations due to financial difficulties divided by the number of banks at risk 
in each week). The kernel is Epanechnikov. The bandwidth is two weeks, which is wide enough 
to reveal trends without obscuring short-term shifts in the probability of failure. 
 
Source: See text. 
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Figure 2 

































Notes: The vertical axis indicates the probability of experiencing distress predicted by regression 
(1) in Table 4. The horizontal access indicates the first principal component of the seven 
measures of foreign financial exposure listed as independent variables in Table 4.  
 
Sources: See text. 
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Figure 3 
Weekly Hazard for Voluntary Mergers and Consolidation Due to Distress 
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Notes: The series for consolidations is identical to that in Figure 1. The hazard rate for mergers 
is a non-parametric estimate constructed by kernel-smoothing raw hazard rates (i.e. mergers per 
week divided by number of banks at risk). The kernel is Epanechnikov. The bandwidth is five 
weeks. 
 
Source: St. 6386 Database, see Richardson 2006 for details. 
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